vention, raised this objection: "Has a man in Virginia a number of votes in proportion to the number of his slaves? and if negroes are not represented in the States to which they belong, why should they be represented in the general government?" (Debates, p. 314.)
This was not one of the common criticisms, and the following passage in No. 54 seems like a distinct echo of it: "It may be replied, perhaps, that slaves are not included in the estimate of representatives in any of the States possessing them. They neither vote themselves nor increase the votes of their masters. Upon what principle, then, ought they to be taken into the federal estimate of representation?" (Fed., p. 341).
Number 54.
"We have hitherto (i. e. in this defense) proceeded on the idea that representation related to persons only, and not at all to property. But is it a just idea? Government is instituted no less for protection of the property, than of the persons, of individuals" (p. 342).
Madison.
"In a general view I see no reason why the rights of property, which chiefly bears the burden of Government and is so much an object of legislation, should not be respected as much as personal rights in the choice of Rulers." (Writings, I, 181. Letter to John Brown, Aug. 23, 1785.) "This middle course reconciles the two cardinal objects of government, the rights of persons and the rights of property." Ibid., 187.
The evidence in regard to the next four numbers is scanty and ambiguous. They take up questions which Madison did not discuss in his letters and speeches in much detail, and which Hamilton did discuss in the New York Convention. The questions, too, were the most obvious ones concerning the constitution of the House of Representatives, and the arguments advanced in these four numbers cover the
