whether it be the existence of a series of events in time only,[1] as in mere psychical acts, or existence both in space and time, as is the case in all outward acts.
Neither to give a proper definition of the real, nor to discuss the nature of existence in space and time, and its relation to thought in general, and in particular to human thought, even were I competent to do it, would be possible here. But I do not suppose I shall find much contradiction if I say that the predominant character of existence in space and time is, in one word, its particularness, what is ordinarily called its concreteness, the infinitude of its relations. An existing thing and the mere thought of a thing are not the same, if that be taken to mean that there is no difference between them; and, especially in morals, the distance between theory and fact is as immeasurable as the distance between what is thought and what is willed, between a definition and the thing defined. As I have said before, we can not go into these fundamental questions, but so much seems clear—that, as against a theory, definition, or abstract principle, the main character of existence in space and time is the endless detail of its particular relations. You can not particularize a definition so as to exhaust any sensible object, since that object stands in relation to every other thing in the world.
Let us say then that to realize (whatever else it is beside) is at least to particularize, and we shall see how the theory of duty for duty’s sake contradicts itself. (1) It says you are not to do what it says you are to do; what you have to effect is the negation of the particular; and so it says in a breath, realize and do not realize. (2) It gives you no content; and that which has no content can not be willed, since in volition we must have the same content on each side. (3) Psychically considered, an act of will is a particular act, and hence a formal act of will is impossible.
To explain—(1) You are to realize the good will, and that means the formal will, or the universal will. But universal means the
- ↑ This is true of course only so long as psychical events are considered simply as such. Every psychical state has also, I suppose, its existence in space. In this connection let me add in passing, that whether the will has direct control over the thoughts or not is an open question in psychology. It is indifferent to us here what answer be given.
