good of its own, but by sight or faith beholds its accomplishment, if at all, outside of and beyond its individual existence.
Answers to two more questions, and then we have done. The first is, Can there be self-sacrifice for the bad; for the bad, that is, when known as bad? It is perhaps a matter for doubt, but we incline to the negative view. We have seen that the bad is not desired in its quality of bad for the sake of that quality; but the difficulty which remains is that, for the sake of something known to be bad, persons do seem to give up their existence, while aware that they will or may do so. A closer consideration may, however, dispose of these cases. They may be divided into two classes, passionate and deliberate. In the former an element of self-sacrifice is wanting, i.e. the having the consequences in view. Fierce hate and hot lust for a mortal pleasure lead men to death; as the poet says,
| Our natures do pursue, Like rats that ravin down their proper bane, A thirsty evil ; and when we drink we die. |
But the point here is this, Is the end only before the mind, with blindness to the possible result; or is that result considered? If it is not considered, there is no self-sacrifice proper. The second class is the deliberate pursuit of bad objects, with a readiness to consider and face all consequences, even one’s own death; sacrifice of oneself, in short, for a bad cause. Here the important point is this, Is the cause really known as bad: or is the conscience confused, so as to take bad for good, or at least to see good in the bad besides its badness? And on our answer to that question will depend our finding. Self-sacrifice is admitted, but the doubt is, was it not after all for the sake of what seemed good? And, unless we remove that doubt, we can not maintain the possibility of self-sacrifice for evil.
The last enquiry is, whether all self-sacrifice must be religious; and here we are decided in the negative. It might be urged that the will to suppress the temporal self implies a will made one with what is above all finite things, a will identified with a non-temporal will; and that here (whether it call itself so or not) we have religion. But this, I think, will not hold. Of course, if self-
