CHAPTER III
THE REAL AND THE RATIONAL
In the previous chapter we discussed the meaning of the principle of thought which Hegel calls the notion, and we shall find that this is the fundamental principle of which the ethical world in all its forms is the articulation. But before examining the notion in its shape as an ethical system we have to deal with it in another of its forms. We have already briefly indicated the attitude of Hegel's philosophy to things, but we have confined our attention almost exclusively to his logical standpoint. We must, therefore, determine more precisely the view he takes of the special nature of ethical philosophy. In so doing we shall be elaborating the analysis of the notion, for philosophy is a form of reflective thought, and its moments are articulations of the basal principle of all mental life. Hegel's adoption of a scientific attitude in ethics has provoked severe criticism; and in order to understand precisely what Hegel means by science here we shall examine his attitude in its general bearings. The main topic we have to discuss in this chapter is the identity of and distinction between the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of the ethical world. It seems advisable, therefore, to pursue our inquiry at first with special reference to Hegel's explicit statements regarding the philosophy of nature. The identity and difference which we seek will thereby become plainer when we analyse the specific nature of mind.
For Hegel philosophy is a concrete attitude of mind; it is not mere practice, nor yet is it what is usually called mere theory. Both in his early voyage of discovery, the Phenomenology, and in his more mature Encyclopaedia he places it highest in the ranks of the concrete attitudes of mind. Of course philosophy is not itself the whole of being; its content is not the absolute in all its fullness, breadth, and detail; nor is it all knowledge, for it treats much that is known, and which doubtless deserves to be known, as irrelevant, and
