most profitable things which can be done in Ethics, and one which has been too much neglected hitherto. But I have not space to attempt it here.
I have only space for two final remarks. The first is that there do seem to be two important characteristics, which are common to absolutely all intrinsic goods, though not peculiar to them. Namely (1) it does seem as if nothing can be an intrinsic good unless it contains both some feeling and also some other form of consciousness; and, as we have said before, it seems possible that amongst the feelings contained must always be some amount of pleasure. And (2) it does also seem as if every intrinsic good must be a complex whole containing a considerable variety of different factors—as if, for instance, nothing so simple as pleasure by itself, however intense, could ever be any good. But it is important to insist (though it is obvious) that neither of these characteristics is peculiar to intrinsic goods: they may obviously also belong to things bad and indifferent. Indeed, as regards the first, it is not only true that many wholes which contain both feeling and some other
