intrinsic value, is not, it holds, true of value of any other kind.
And a second point which should be noticed about this theory is the following. It is often represented as asserting that pleasure is the only thing which is ultimately good or desirable, and pain the only thing which is ultimately bad or undesirable; or as asserting that pleasure is the only thing which is good for its own sake, and pain the only thing which is bad for its own sake. And there is, I think, a sense in which it does assert this. But these expressions are not commonly carefully defined; and it is worth noticing that, if our theory does assert these propositions, the expressions “ultimately good” or “good for its own sake” must be understood in a different sense from that which has been assigned above to the expression “intrinsically good.” We must not take “ultimately good” or “good for its own sake” to be synonyms for “intrinsically good.” For our theory most emphatically does not assert that pleasure is the only thing intrinsically good, and pain the only thing intrinsically evil. On the contrary,
