be no such characteristic—there can be no characteristic which always belongs to right actions, and never to wrong ones: since, if so much as one single action is both right and wrong, this action must possess any characteristic (if there is one) which always belongs to right actions, and, at the same time, since the action is also wrong, this characteristic cannot be one which never belongs to wrong actions. Before, therefore, we enter on any discussions as to what characteristic there is which always belongs to right actions and never to wrong ones, it is extremely important that we should satisfy ourselves, if we can, that one and the same action cannot be both right and wrong, either at the same time or at different times. For, if this is not the case, then all such discussions must be absolutely futile. I propose, therefore, first of all, to raise the simple issue: Can one and the same action be both right and wrong, either at the same time or at different times? Is the theory stated in the last two chapters in the right, so far as it merely asserts that this cannot be the case?
