And I think that some argument of this sort is the chief reason why many people are apt to hold that one and the same action may be both right and wrong. They are much impressed by the fact that different men do feel quite differently towards the same classes of action, and, holding also that, when we judge an action to be right or wrong, we must be merely making a judgment about somebody’s feelings, it seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that one and the same action often is both right and wrong. This conclusion does not, indeed, necessarily follow from these two doctrines taken together. Whether it follows or not, depends on the precise form in which we hold the latter doctrine—upon who the somebody is about whose feelings we are making the assertion. But it does follow from the precise form of this doctrine which we are now considering—the form which asserts that each man is merely making an assertion about his own feelings. And, since this is one of the most plausible forms in which the doctrine can be held, it is extremely important to consider, whether it can be true
