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7/28/97
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/GCL
DECLASSIFY ON: 29K (1)(6)
(PER NSA LTR
DTD 4/15/97)

Classified by Multiple Sources
Declassify on: OADR
8/1/85

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

TOP SECRET

Office Memorandum ● UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: L. V. BoardmanDATE: Feb. 1, 1956

CC -- Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Branigan
Tully
B. A. Wells
RETURN TO BELMONT FOR FILING
File in 1734

FROM: A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT:  
ESPIONAGE — R

Purpose of attached summary is to consider possibilities of using   information for prosecution. In order to view this matter in its proper perspective it was believed necessary to set forth exactly what   information is as well as to briefly review the origin and history of how the Bureau came to receive this traffic. Consequently, the attached summary is divided into four parts as follows:

I. EXPLANATION AND HISTORY OF   INFORMATION
II. WHO HAS KNOWLEDGE OF   INFORMATION?
III. NATURE OF   MESSAGES AND USE OF COVER NAMES
IV. PROSECUTION
A. Advantages
B. Disadvantages
C. Communications Intelligence Restrictions
D. Political Implications
E. International Implications
F. Effects on Pending Cases

There is no question that justice would be properly served if Judith Coplon and the Silvermaster-Perlo groups could be successfully prosecuted for their crimes against the United States. The introduction into evidence of   information could be the turning point in the successful prosecution of these subjects; however, a careful study of all factors involved compels the conclusion that it would not be in the best interests of the U.S. or the Bureau to attempt to use   information for prosecution: 1) the question of law involved--whether or not the   information would be admitted into evidence as an exception to the hearsay evidence rule; 2) the fragmentary nature of the messages and the extensive use of cover names therein make positive identification of the subjects difficult; 3) the severe restrictions surrounding the mention of communications intelligence data and the anticipated objections from the National Security Agency, the U.S. Communications Intelligence Board and perhaps the National Security Council against public disclosure of U.S. efforts and successes in the communications intelligence field;

 

Enclosure
  ENCLOSURE
ERT:emb

FEB 13 1956