Page:Faruqi v Hanson (2024, FCA).pdf/68

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267 In King-Ansell v Police [1979] 2 NZLR 531 the Court of Appeal of New Zealand held that Jews in New Zealand form a group with common "ethnic origins" within the meaning of the Race Relations Act 1971 (NZ). The relevant prohibition was against inciting hostility or ill-will against, or bringing into contempt or ridicule, any group of persons in New Zealand on the ground of "colour, race, or ethnic or national origins of that group of persons." The charge sheet was framed specifically in relation to "Jews, on the ground of their ethnic origins." The appeal against the conviction was dismissed unanimously on the basis that Jews are an ethnic group within the meaning of the statutory language. All three judgments recognise that "ethnic origins" appears in a composite expression which includes colour, race and national origin, which has a bearing on its meaning, and that "race" has a broad and popular meaning in the provision, and not a narrow meaning dependent on common genetic characteristics: at 533–534 per Richmond P, at 537 per Woodhouse J and at 542 per Richardson J.

268 The judgment of Richardson J, which is singled out in the EM, commands particular attention. His Honour adopted a meaning of "race" and the associated words from the statutory provision as applying to any more or less clearly defined group thought of as a unit usually because of a common or presumed common past (at 543). From that, his Honour held that:

a group is identifiable in terms of its ethnic origins if it is a segment of the population distinguished from others by a sufficient combination of shared customs, beliefs, traditions and characteristics derived from a common or presumed common past, even if not drawn from what in biological terms is a common racial stock. It is that combination which gives them an historically determined social identity in their own eyes and in the eyes of those outside the group. They have a distinct social identity based not simply on group cohesion and solidarity but also on their belief as to their historical antecedents.

269 In Mandla v Dowell Lee [1983] 2 AC 548 (HL) the question was whether Sikhs were a "racial group" where that statutory expression was defined as a group of persons "defined by reference to colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national origins." The case turned on whether Sikhs were a group defined by "ethnic origins." Lord Fraser of Tullybelton, with whom the other members of the Appellate Committee agreed, held as follows (at 562):

For a group to constitute an ethnic group in the sense of the Act of 1976, it must, in my opinion, regard itself, and be regarded by others, as a distinct community by virtue of certain characteristics. Some of these characteristics are essential; others are not essential but one or more of them will commonly be found and will help to distinguish the group from the surrounding community. The conditions which appear to me to be essential are these: (1) a long shared history, of which the group is conscious as distinguishing it from other groups, and the memory of which it keeps alive; (2) a cultural tradition of its own, including family and social customs and manners, often but not necessarily associated with religious observance. In addition to those two

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