Thus, in the Australian context, to be Islamophobic is almost invariably also to be racist, and in this specific context it was. That Senator Hanson's tweet was in part motivated by Senator Faruqi's identity as a Muslim, means that race, colour or national or ethnic origin were equally motivating factors in the publication of the tweet.
291 For those reasons, the para (b) requirements are amply established in relation to the racist, anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim messages of the tweet. That is to say, a cause of Senator Hanson having tweeted in the terms that she did was the race, colour or national or ethnic origin of Senator Faruqi.
SECTION 18D(C)(II) – FAIR COMMENT
The principles
292 The onus of proof in relation to s 18D lies on the respondent: Toben v Jones at [41]; Eatock v Bolt at [338]–[339]; Clarke at [116].
293 The requirement that the relevant act was done "reasonably and in good faith" in order to enjoy the protection offered by s 18D applies to each of the exemptions set out in its paragraphs.
294 As far as reasonableness is concerned, there must be "a rational relationship" between what is said or done and an activity in ss 18D(a)–(c) in the sense that it was said or done "for the purpose" of the activity and "in a manner calculated to advance the purpose": Bropho at [79]–[80]; Clarke at [119]–[120]. Further, what is said or done must not be "disproportionate to what is necessary to carry it [viz the activity in ss 18D(a)–(c)] out": Bropho at [79], [139]–[140]; Clarke at [122]; Eatock v Bolt at [349], [414], [439]. For example, being "gratuitously insulting or offensive" in relation to "a matter that is irrelevant" to the activity in ss 18D(a)–(c) may be unreasonable: Bropho at [81]; Clarke at [121].
295 Reasonableness in s 18D is ultimately an objective question: Bropho at [79]; Comcare v Martinez (No 2) [2013] FCA 439; 212 FCR 272 at [82] per Robertson J. It is "informed by the normative elements of ss 18C and 18D": Bropho at [79]. "[T]here may be more than one way of doing things 'reasonably'" and the question is "not whether it could have been done more reasonably or in a different way more acceptable to the Court": Bropho at [79]; Martinez at [82].
296 The requirement of "good faith" has an objective and a subjective element: Clarke at [133]; Eatock v Bolt at [346]–[348]. Subjective good faith requires "subjective honesty and legitimate
