freedom of communication about government and political matters required by the Constitution. I accordingly reject the respondent's argument that the RDA should be declared unconstitutional "for the sake of freedom to communicate political matters."
348 As identified above, under the modern case law there are in effect three sub-inquiries that combine as an analytical tool for the assessment of whether a law is reasonable appropriate and adapted to serving a legitimate end: Brown at [280] per Nettle J, Gageler and Gordon JJ agreeing.
Suitability
349 The suitability inquiry looks at whether there is a "rational connection between the provision in question and the statute's legitimate purpose, such that the statute's purpose can be furthered." "[I]t does not involve a value judgment about whether the legislature could have approached the matter in a different way", and a law is unsuitable only if it "cannot contribute to the realisation of the statute's legitimate purpose." See McCloy at [80].
350 There can be little doubt that there is a rational connection between Pt IIA and the purpose identified above (at [342]). Senator Hanson barely argues against such a conclusion.
Necessity
351 The necessity inquiry "looks to whether there is an alternative measure available which is equally practicable when regard is had to the purpose pursued, and which is less restrictive of the freedom than the impugned provision": Farm Transparency at [46]. This does not deny that it is the role of the legislature to select the means by which a legitimate statutory purpose may be achieved: McCloy at [82]; Unions No 2 at [47]. It is "not a prescription to engage in an assessment of the relative merits of competing legislative models": Brown at [282], [286]. There is a "domain of selections" that may further the legislative purpose while imposing a permissible burden on the implied freedom: McCloy at [82]. All of those legislative selections will satisfy the test of necessity.
352 Consequently, a law is not ordinarily to be regarded as unnecessary unless there is an obvious and compelling alternative which is equally practicable and available and would result in a significantly lesser burden on the implied freedom: Banerji at [35].
353 An alternative will not be "equally practicable" unless it is "as capable of fulfilling [the] purpose as the means employed by the impugned provision, 'quantitatively, qualitatively, and probability-wise'": Tajjour at [114]; Farm Transparency at [46]. Where the burden imposed by the impugned provisions is small, logically it may be difficult or impossible for a party to
