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In such a case, my duty was too plain to be mistaken. I have exercised all the power which the constitution and laws confer upon me, but that power has been resisted by a force too strong for me to overcome. It is possible that the officer who has incurred this grave responsibility may have misunderstood his instructions, and exceeded the authority intended to be given him; I shall, therefore, order all the proceedings in this case, with my opinion, to be filed and recorded in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Maryland, and direct the clerk to transmit a copy, under seal, to the president of the United States. It will then remain for that high officer, in fulfilment of his constitutional obligation to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed," to determine what measures he will take to cause the civil process of the United States to be respected and enforced.

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MERS fCONOVER v.). and 3,123. See Cases Nos. 3,122 Case 'No. 9,488. MERSEROLli; et al. v. UNION PAPER COL- LAR CO. [3 Fish. Pat Cas. 483; 6 Blatchf. 356.] i Circuit Court, S. D. New York. March 27, 3869. Courts — Jdrisdictioh — A.vebmest of Citizen- ship—State COUBTS — JUIIISDICTIOS OVER PAT- ENTS — AoTHORiTr TO Abjodge Void — License —Suit to Repeal. . It is not sufficient to aver that the com- plainants are citizens of the United States. It should appear, affirmatively, that they are not citizens of the same state with the defendants. [Cited in Lewis v. Hitchcock, 10 Fed. 6.] . The only authority to adjudge letters pat- ent void, conferred by any statute of the United States, is found in section 16 of the act of 1836 [5 Stat. 123], and section 10 of the act of 1839 [Id. 354], and extends no farther than to a case of two interfering patents, and to a case where the granting of a patent is refused by the com- missioners of patents, or by one of the justices of the District of Columbia on appeal. . "Whether the suit be one by a licensor, to enforce the covenants contained in a license granted under a patent, or be one by the licensee to destroy and annul the license and its cove- nants, it is equally impossible to find in the sub- ject matter any basis for the jurisdiction of a circuit court of the United States. [Cited in White v. Lee, 3 Fed, 224; Teas v. Albright, 13 Fed. 413; Albright v. Teas, 106 U. S. 620, 1 Sup. Ct 556.] . If the license is void, because the patent is void, the fact that the plaintifE must show that the patent is void, in order to get rid of the license, does not make the case one arising un- der the patent act so as to give jurisdiction to a circuit courL . A state court has jurisdiction to decree a license to be void and inoperative for fraud, or

[Reported by Samuel S. Fisher, Esq., and 

by Hon. Samuel Blatchford, District Judge, and here compiled and reprinted by permission. The syllabus and opinion are from 3 Fish. Pat. Cas. 483, and the statement is from 6 Blatchf. 356.]

any other adequate reason, and the fact that, in the investigation, the state court will be obliged to inquire whether there was anything new in the patents which could operate as a considera- tion for the license, can not deprive the state court of jurisdiction, or confer it upon a circuit court of the United States. [Cited in brief in Havana Press Drill Co. v. Ashurst, 148 111. 121, 35 N. E. 873. Crit- icised in Continental Store Service Co. v. Clark, 100 N. Y. 368, 3 N. E. 335.] . A state court can not take cognizance of a suit brought for the infringement of a patent nor of a direct suit brought to decree a patent to be void, but when a patent comes in question collaterally, its validity must become a subject of inquiry in the state courts. . Every dtizen has, abstractly, the same in- terest with every other citizen, that a void pat- ent shall not be in existence. Yet such interest is not sufficient to warrant the maintenance of a suit to repeal a patent . A suit to repeal a patent, except in the cases stated in section 16 of the act of 1836, and sec- tion 10 of the act of 1839, can not be brought either in a state court or a circuit court of the United States. . Section 16 of the act of 1836 and section 17 must be construed together, and the confiding of authority by section 16, to declare a patent void, in certain specified cases, must be regarded as intended not to confer such authority in any other cases. [This was a bill in equity, to which a de- murrer was interposed by the defendants. The plaintiffs [Cornelius M. Merserole and James L. Libby] were described, in the bill, as "citizens of the United States," but they were not averred to be citizens of any state of the United States. The defendants were described as "The Union Paper Collar Company, claiming to be a corporation cre- ated under the laws of the state of New York, and having its office and principal place of business in the Southern district of New York." The plaintiffs were manufacturers of paper collars. On the 9th of January, 1868, they became the assignees, by an assignment in writing, of a license in writing, granted by the defendants, on the 11th of May, 1866, to the Norwich Paper Collar Company, to make and sell collars, cuffs, and bosoms of paper, or of cloth and paper, according to any or all of nine several letters patent, granted by the United States, and set forth in the license, on the payment to the licensors of certain specified current tariffs. The assignment of the license to the plaintiffs was made with the consent of the defendants, and on the as- sumption, by the plaintiffs, of the covenants of the license as to the payment of tariffs, and otherwise. The bill averred, that the plaintiffs purchased the license on the strength of representations, previously made to them by the defendants, that the patents were valid, and that the plaintiffs, if they purchased the license, would be allowed to make and sell four millions of paper collars, without paying therefor. It also averred, that the patents were, all of them, invalid, for want of novelty; that the consideration for the purchase of the license by the plain- tiffs was void; that the plaintiffs had paid