96 i'BÛEEAL EBPORTBB. �the state courts, and I think it would likewise suffice for a foreign corporation, except for the general rule requiring attachments againsl them, which cannot affect us. �I think a trading corporation may be said to be personally present for the purposes of an action wherever it has an established place of trade. This was so decided in England on principle, and as a new question, as late as the year 1872. Neivhy v. Von Oppen, L. K. 7 Q. B. 293. That was the case of the Coït Patent Arms Company, having a house in Lon- don for the sale of its manufactures. In the only other case that I have seen the ticket office of a railroad company was held not to be such a place of trade as to give jurisdiction, and the court say that the question is one of fact in each case. Mackereth v. Glasgoiv R. Co. L. E. 8 Ex. 149. �In the United States most of the cases turn upon the words of a statute, but the reasoning is often more general, and is, I think, in substantial accordance with the law of England, namely, that a trading corporation is of right suable in any country in which it conducts an important part of its busi- ness, Aceordingly the t»ndency of opinion, if I may so call it, is to apply general words concerning corporations to in- clude foreign corporations under those circumstances. See Angell & Ames Corp. §§ i02-406; Eorer Inter-State Law, 282. �Upon the whole I think I am authorized to decide that a foreign corporation may be sued in the circuit court here under the circumstances existing in this case as I understand them ; though the fact of attachment, immaterial to our juris- diction, does not exist. �If the question should be brought up in some new form, and the facts should prove to be different, my decision may be different. �Motion to dismiss denied. ��� �
