LA VIN V. EMIGBANT INDUSTEUIi SAYINGS BANK. 653 �i �decision, the plaintiff was not deprived of his property with- out due process of law. But whether the three dissenting judges dissented on this or on some other ground does not appear. The weight of this case, as an authority on a point on which it is not controUing, is, ho-wever, greatly impaired by tiie dissent of three out of the seven judges constituting the court, there being nothing to show that they did not dis- sent on this very ground. �In considering this question the flrst inquiry is whether, by force of the laws of New York and of the proceedings under them, if they are held valid, the plaintiff has been "deprived of his property" by the state of New York, within the meaning of the constitutional provision; for if he has not been de- prived of his property, or if he has not been so deprived by the state of New York, it neeessarily foUows that the constitutional provision has not been violated, and it need not be further considered whether the means employed in doing what has been done are properly described as "due process of law." An examination of the opinions in the case of Roderigas v. Sav- ings Institution shows that the court did not hold that for ail purposes and in favor of ail persons, as against the supposed decedent, the title to his property vested in the administrator, but only that it so vested in favor of innocent third persons who had dealt with the administrator on the faith of the letters. �The case before the court did not call for anything further than this, and I think it is entirely consistent with the opin- ions delivered that, if the defendant had not paid the deposit to the administrator, and the supposed decedent had himself demanded it, the proceedings in the surrogate's court and the issue of the letters would not have been held to be a defence. In other words, the decision was not strictly that by virtue of the appointment of the administrator and the issue of the letters the title passed, as it undoubtedly does in the case of a deceased person, but that for the protection of the defend- ant and for equitable reasons the supposed decedent was estopped to deny, as against the defendant, that the letters were valid; that the fact of death was as found by the sur- ��� �
