J05NST0N V. BOB. 695 �Hall, Adm'r, 51 Mo. 303; Eichardson v. Harrison, S6 Mo. 96; and, upon the second, to Roger 8 v. Bronson, 61 Mo. 187. �Without determining whether these authorities sustain the propositions stated, we turn to another inquiry, which neces- earily requires prier consideration. Is ittrue that the courts of the United States are bound to follow, as rules of decision in equity cases, the statutes of limitation of the several states, and the construction given to them by the state judiciary? It is insisted that under the twenty-fourth section of the judi- ciary act (Eev. St. § 721) the statutes of limitation of the several states, where no special provision has been made by congress, form the rule of decision in the courts of the United States, and that the same effeot is given to them as is given in the courts of the state. Suoh is undoubtedly the rule in cases at common law, and the statute, by its tenus, applies to no other cases. I think it well settled that a federal court of equity is not bound by such statutes, and much less by the construction given to them by the state tribunals. In the exercise of the chancery jurisdiction conferred by the consti- tution and laws of the United States this court is not governed by the state practice. The supreme couri has repeatedly decided that the rules governing the exercise of this jurisdic- tion are the same in ail the states, and are according to the practice of courts of equity in the parent country, as contra- distinguished from that of courts of law. The exercise of this jurisdiction is regulàted by the act of 1792, (Rev. St. § 913,) which declares that the modes of proceed- ing shall be according to the principles, rules and usages which belong to courts of equity, as contradistinguished from <î0urts of law. The rules of decision in equity cases in the federal courts are to be uniform, and in the exercise of their •equity jurisdiction those courts are unaffected by state legisla- tion. Boyle V. Zachary, 6 Pet. 658 ; United States v. Howland, 4 Wheat. 115; Neves v. Scott, 13 How. 271; Noonan t. Lee, 3 Black. 507; Robinson v. CampbeU, 3 Wheat. 323. �The only question, therefore, is whether this court should, Tipon principle, adopt and follow the statute of limitations of Missouri as construed by the supreme court of that state. ��� �
