794 fEDEBaii BEFOBTEB. �who bas a judgment claim against the debtor, though entirely separate and distinct from the claims of the other plaintiffs. Such a suit is well calculated to present distinct controver- eies, in which some of the plaintiffs or defendants may have no real interest. �The statute says that "when, in any suit, * • there shall be a controversy wbich is wholly between citizens of different states, and which can be fully determined as between them," etc. It does not say an actual controversy, which would exclude merely nominal parties, nor the principal con- troversy, which would devolve upon the court the duty of determining between them which should be considered the main and which the subordinate controversy; but the lan- guage is "a controversy," which means any actual contro- versy in which both parties bave an interest. And that there may be two or more such controversies arising in the same suit is manifest, and is clearly contemplated by the act. �Now, whichever may be considered the principal contro- versy, here are two controversies arising in the same suit, to one of which Peyton S. Davidson is a necessary party, and in which the Keokuk Northern Line Packet Company bas no particular interest, and another to which the Keokuk North- ern Line Packet Company is a necessary party, but which can be fully determined as between it and the plaintiffs with- out the presence of Davidson. This would seem to bring the case within the meaning of the second clause of the section. And I am the more confirmed in this construction by the views of Judge Drummond in Farmers' Loan e Trust Com- pany V. Pekin e Southwestern Ry. Co. 12 Chig. Legal News, No. 8, p. 65, (Nov. 8, 1879.) �But it seems just as clear that, if Peyton S. Davidson had joined in the application for removal, the case would come under the first clause of the section. Indeed, it seems a self- evident proposition that the first clause, adopting, as it does, the language of the constitution, which is the only source of power in such cases, confers ail the jurisdiction which it was competent for congress to confer on the federal courts, except, perhaps, that the right of removal, under that clause, attaches ��� �
