841 PEDERAIi BEPOBTEB. �charge, be subject to the order of the court, and shall, at the expense of the estate, execute all proper writings and instru- ments, and do all acts required by the court, touching the assigned property or estate, and to enable the assignee to demand, reeover and receive all the property aud estate assigned, wherever situated. For neglect or refusai to obey any order of the court the bankrupt may be committed and punished as for a contempt of court." This was part of sec- tion 26 in the original act, By section 14, which defined the title and powers of the assignee, it was also provided that "the debtor shall also, at the request of the assignee, and at the expense of the estate, make and execute any instruments, deeds and writings which may be proper to enable the as- signee to possess himself fully of all the assets of the bank- rupt." This is re-enacted in the revised statutes as section 5051. In the case of In re Dole, 11 Bl. 499, it was held that the summary power of the court to compel the bankrupt to submit to examination^under section 26 was limited to the time prior to his discharge, and that the discharge was the termination of his proceeding, so far as he is concerned. �The argument is still stronger against the exercise of the summary power to compel the execution of papera after the discharge, because this part of the section contains the words "until his discharge," which seem designed to limit this very power. The provision cited above, from section 14, does not enlarge the power of the court. The provision in sec- tion 26 is evidently intended to give a remedy for enforoing the duty imposed on the bankrupt by section 14, which declares it to be his duty to make and execute all such necessary in- struments at the request of the assignee. Construing them together as parts of a single law they are, it would seem, sub- ject to the same limitation that the act required to be done is to be done dnring the pendency of the proceeding and before the discharge. The use of the word "debtor," instead of "bankrupt," in section 14, is relied on as giving that section a more liberal construction. But I cannot see how it has any euch force. After his discharge the former bankrupt is no longer a "debtor," any more than he is a "bankrupt." ��� �
