PBNTLARGE V, BBESTON. 867 �court ; nor has the contrary been contended here. But it îs contended that the contempt proceeding ■ffill, of neeessity, involve the question as to the effect of the invalidity of the agreement of compromise upon the liability of the defend- ants to punishment, and that this question cannot, with pro- priety, be passed on by this court at this time, upon a motion to commit the defendants, but should be left to be determined by the suit brought in the state court. �To this position taken by the defendants I have given careful attention, and with a sincere desire not to deprive the plaintiff of any right that he may have to ask an adjudi- cation of this question at the hands of this court, and my conclusion is that the plaintiff will be deprived of no right by staying, for the present, the proceeding to punish the defendants for contempt ; and that the action taken by the state court renders it proper that such proceedings should be stayed untn the state court shall bave determined the ques- tions of -which it has become possessed by the suit there instituted. That the state court has jurisdiction to enter- tain that suit, and to determine whether the license has or has not been lawf ully revoked, and whether the agreement of compromise shall be set aside or upheld, must be deemed to be settled by authority. Hartell v. Tilghman, (and cases cited,) 99 U. S. E. 574. It is true that a determination respect- ing the validity of the agreement of compromise may be made to depend upon the construction to be given to the two patents in question, and so a question arising under the patent laws be determined by a state court ; but such a ques- tion is not necessarily to be decided by the state court, for it may be held that ignorance of the existence of the Taylor patent, whatever may be its terms, affords no ground upon which to set aside the agreement of compromise. �It seems, therefore, that the jurisdiction of the state court to entertain the action there brought is not open to be ques- tioned. Thus much being conceded, it is impossible to deny the competency of the state court to determine whether in equity the plaintiff should be allowed to derive advantages from the agreement of compromise, or to treat the license as ��� �
