OLNEY V. TANNER. 107 �ings in bankruptcy. Unless at that time he already held the title, it became by section 50-1:6 "vested" in the assignee in bankruptcy, and no subsequent suit would avail him ; nor, unlees he had some title paramount to that of such assignee, could he maintain any action to set aside the voluntary assignment af ter the appointaient of the assignee in bankruptcy, as the supreme court has held that right to be vested exclusively in the latter. Glenny v. Langdon, 98 U. S. 20, 27 ; TrimbU v. Woodhead, 102 U. S. 647 ; Moyer v. Dewey, 103 U. S. 301. �The plaintiff claims that the order appointing him receiver invested him instanter with the title to this property, on two grounds : First, because the voluntary assignment had become under the state law absolutely "void" for want of schednles being filed as required ; second, because it was made with an actual intent to defraud creditors. �When this case was previously before the court upon demurrer to the bill of complaint (19 N. B. E. 178) it was assumed that the as- signment was absolutely void under the state law, according to the allegations of the bill, which the demurrer admitted; and, the title being therefore legally in the debtor, that the appointment of the plain- tiff as receiver transferred the debtor's title to the receiver as in or- dinary cases, (Porter v. Williams, 5 Seld. 142,) and consequently that his title was antecedent and paramount to that of the assignee ; and the demurrer was therefore overruled. �It now appears that the assignment was executed and delivered on March 28, 1877, and that, by the state law then in force, a failure to file schedules as directed by the statute did not invalidate the assign- ment. Brennan v. Willson, 71 N. Y. 502 ; In re Croughwell, 17 N. B. E. 337; Tkrasher v. Bentley, 59 N. Y. 649 ; Hardmann v. Bowen, 39 N. Y. 196, 199. The act of 1877, making assignments "void" if scheduIes were not filed within 30 days after the assignment was executed, was not passed until June 16th, nearly three months after this assignment was made. Section 28 of the latter act (Laws 1877, chapter 466) repeals prior acts, but declares that this repeal "shall not affect any proceedings had ; and any proceedings pending under the act hereby referred to may be continued under this act." But as 30 days after the assignment of March 28th had already expired long before June 16th, when this act was passed, the new act could not possibly be applied in that particular to the assignment in question. The act declares that the repeal of former acts shail "not affect any proceed- ings had." One of the "proceedings already had" in this case was the vesting of the title to this property in the assignee without liability ��� �
