110 f;bdbrai4 bbporteb. �ceiver, as the representative of the ereditor, miglit maintain such a bill to impeach the fraudaient conveyance as the ereditor himself might have done. The ground of the right of action thus allowed is not that the receiver already has the title to the property, but only that he represents the ereditor, and as such has a right to assail the fraudu- lent grant by suit. The ereditor, however, bas no title to the prop- erty, nor has he even any lien upon it, until he files his bill, or levies his execution if the property be chattels. Lawrence v. Bank of Repith- lic, 35 N. Y. 320. . �As stated before, the Code adopted the former practiee as to receiv- ers, with no substantial enlargement of their powers. By the old Code, § 298, the receiver, on filingthe order appointing him, isvested "with the property and effects of the judgraent debtor." Section 299 (see new Code, § 2447) expressly declared that "if it appear that a person alleged to have property of the judgment debtor claims an interest in the property adverse to him, such interest shall be recov- erable only in an action against such person by the receiver." Ac- cordingly, the unqualified language of section 297, which authorized the court to apply to the satisfaction of the judgment "any property of the judgment debtor in the hands of himself or any other person," has, been construed to mean only property of which the debtor was the unquestioned owner, not including property fraudulently con- veyed. Bodman v. Henry, 17 N. Y. 484; Lathrop v. Clapp, 40 N. Y. 328, 333. , The same construction and the same limitation would seem to be applicable to the same words of section 298, which purport to vest the receiver "with the property and effects of the judgment debtor, " so that they cannot be held to eSect any transf er, ipso facto, of a present title to property which has been conveyed by the debtor in fraud of ereditors. �The uniform course of adjudication since the Code is to the same effect, wherever the question has been really presented. If the re- ceiver, by virtue of his appointment, were ipso facto vested with the title to such property, the proceedings appointing him would be a gooddefence to an action of trespass for taking the property. Where the receiver obtains a title direct from the judgment debtor it has been held that he can maintain trover for conversion of the property. Wilson V. Allen, 6 Barb. 542. But as respects property fraudulently assigned by the debtor, he has no such title as will protect him against an action of trespass. �In Brown v. GUmore, 16 How- Pr. 527, this precise question arose in a suit for trespass where the defendants, the agents pf a receiver. ��� �
