lis FEOEBAL BEPOBTEB. �improvidently granted, not entirely because of irregularities, But because the decree is void for want of jurisdiction to make it. I shall not stop to inquire how far, conceding. the jurisdiction of the court, the petitioners may go in the correction of mere irregularities in the bankruptcy proceedings by a petition of this character, because treat- ing the demurrer as if it challenged the right to do this, it cannot be sustained for the reason that it is too broad and goes to the whole petition, as well that part which attacks the jurisdiction to grant the discharge as that which seeks to avoid it for irregularities. Indeed, I think the petition itself only sets out these irregularities as aver- ments of facts showing a want of jurisdiction to grant the discharge ; and whether so intended or not that must be its legal effect, for I take it that mere irregularities can only be corrected, while the case is pending, by this court itself, or the circuit court, on a supervisory petition, as other errors are corrected in bankruptcy proceedings, and not otherwise. There is no prayer to correct errors in that sense, but one to annul the discharge for want of jurisdiction, and I shall treat the petition as filed for that sole purpose. �The record of the bankruptcy proceedings, furnished me by counsel with their briefs, does not contain the original petition in bankruptcy, and if I could look into it all in determining this demurrer, I do not now know what are its averments. This petition does not show, but only states, that he was not a resident or citizen of this district. I infer from what is alleged in this petition that the bankruptcy petition was the copartnership petition of Lonsdale & Thompson. This petition to set aside the- discharge assumes that as to the individual liabilities of Thompson there can be no discharge, unless he was a resident or citi- zen of this district, and that a failure to file schedules of his individual debts and assets renders a decree granting him a discharge void for want of jurisdiction. The crediter iiling this petition to annul the dis- charge was, as appears by the petition itself, a crediter of the firm as well as a crediter of Thompson individually, and he actually ap- peared and conteisted Lonsdale's right to a discharge by filing speci- heations in opposition to it, which were decided in favor of the bank- rupt. Having procured from the clerk the original petition, I find that it avers that "the petition of John G. Lonsdale, Jr., of the county of Shelby and state of Tennessee, and George G. Thompson, of the parish of Carroll and state of Louisiana, respectively composing the firm of Thompson & Lonsdale, and district aforesaid, respectfully represents that the said John G. Lonsdale, Jr., and George G. Thomp- son, copartners, transacting business at Memphis, in the county of. ��� �
