ALLEN V. THOMPSON. 123 �ing that the statute requires special notice, and I think the failure to give it bas somewhat the aame effect that a failure. to serve any orig- inal process would have in a suit at law or in equity. What that precise effect would be in a collateral proceeding may be doubtful. It was held in Shclton v. Pease, 10 Mo, 473, that the want of notice under the act of 1841 would not have the effect to avoid the dis- charge, and in Linton v. Stanton, 4 La. Ann. 401, that it would be inconsistent with the strong language of the act giving effect to the certifioate of discharge to pronounoe the decree a nullity for want of the prescribed notice. I do not, in the least, doubt that in all collateral proceedings, as suits like those, this is, under the act of 1867, more entirely true than under the act of 1841, and that the «ertifieate is conclusive whether the record shows notice or not. But in a direct proceeding to vacate the decree granting the discharge this principle bas no application. A crediter relying on this section may reasonably expect notice of the application for discharge, and if it be not given the debtor may obtain a discharge by escaping all opposition from bis creditors. There must be some mode of vacating Buch a decree. The bankruptcy statutes do not presoribe any, and yfe are lef t to rely on that inherent power of all courts to correct sueh «rrors as this. At common law there were writs of error coram nobis, the audita querela, and perhaps other methods of procedure, and where these and writs of error or appeal, and the certiorari and super- sedeas, were inadequate, a bill in equity could be resorted to for relief. It must be that the court granting such a decree is authorized to correct a proceeding that should be, at least in its own forum, a nullity. There is the greater reason for this since in all other courts the certificate is, by virtue of the statute, conclusive. There are abundant modes of doing such work in the state courts, and a mere motion often suffices. We are not embarrassed, in this court, by any limitation as to terms of court whicb are not known as to our bankruptcy jurisdiction. The English bankruptcy courts possessed plenary power to supersede the commission, as it was called, or cor- rect such errors; and while we cannot claim, perhaps, all their powers in that direction, we may, unquestionably, assume that, by necessary implication, our statutes confer on these courts ample authority to undo this wrong in the administration of the act. The authorities sustain it, and I am content to merely cite them without comment on their particular application to this case. Freeman, Judgments, §§ 90-148; Hilliard, Bankruptcy, 406-414; Ex parte Christy, 3 How. 293, 312, 315; Ee Morris, Crabbe, 70; Re Walker, ��� �
