198 FEDERAL RBPOBTBB. �compared to that given by Guiteau. Vulgar and insolent as the claimant was, his vulgarity and insolence were trivial eompared to those whlch Gui- teau exhibited to court as well as to counsel. Yet observe, in this respect, the contrast: Chief Justice Cockburn sat with a full bejicli of associates, in all the splendors of his robes and of his high state, in the full consciousness of gifts of sarcasm and of invective such as few orators ever possessed, and of gifts of cross-examination and of advocacy such as scarcely any lawyer of his day could equal. These immense powers of sarcasm and of invective, during a trial which lasted a month, he did not shrink from pouring on the elaimant's head. The elaimant's coarse wit was turned against him by wit which, if not coarse, was at least domineering. The claimaiit's audacity was met by stern denunciations and flerce rebuke, which shovved that the judge believed him to be guilty and determined to destroy his defence. The trial was a personal struggle between the defendant and the chief justice. The defendant, with all his cunning and doggedness was overmatched; and yet, when the trial was closed by a charge of the chief justice, wbich now occupies two large volumes, and which is the most eonsummate piece of judicial advocacy in existence, it was felt that although the defendant was probably guilty, he had not beeu fairly tried. Far different, however, is the feeling in respect to Guiteau's case. The temptation to Judge Oox to deal impatiently with Guiteau, let it be remem- bered, was far greater than was the temptation to Chief Justice Cockburn to deal impatiently with the claimant. The elaimant's impudence was slight eompared with that of Guiteau. The claimant had a defence on the merits ; Guiteau had none. The claimant had a respectable body of adherents. Guiteau, with the single exception of a brother-in-law espousing his cause, from motives most honorable, but purely exceptional, had not a friend or sympathizer, but was the object of the execrations of the entire population of the United States. If ever a judge could have been naturally tempted to throw his personal force against a prisoner it was in this case of Guiteau. If ever personal disgust and contempt of a prisoner could have been naturally expected to enter into a judge's heart, it was on Guiteau's trial. So strong was this feeling, that, with a very few exceptions, the public press became impatient, when day after day Guiteau was permitted to pursue his course of unchecked profanity and indeconcy in the management of his own defence; and it was more than once stated that articles of impeachment were prepar- ing in the house of representatives to test the competency of a judge who had permitted such outrages as those which Judge Cox was alleged to have per- mitted in the pending trial. The case, it was supposed, was aggravated by the fact that there was a reported case in which a federal judge of high authority had held that where a defendant on trial behaves so boisteriously as to prevent the decent progress of the procedure, he can be removed from the court-room and the case go on in his absence. U. S. v. Davis, 6 Blatchf. 464. In the eighth edition of my bock on Crirninal Practice and Pleading, I said that " unless such a check be applied, the defendant, by violent and turbu- lent couduct, could at any time either bring his trial to an end, or compel its extension, under circumstances destructive of pfublic decorum." This, I still liold; but I think that in Guiteau's case it was wise in Judge Cox not to use this extreme prerogative, however gre;it the temptation was. In the first plea ��� �
