84 fedbbal befobteb. �fore us, and it is plain they add no force to it, and cannot take the case out of the statute. Does the first clause? �The original act of 1789, chapter 23, § 4, read: "If any crediter, wbo, after making demand of bis debt, shall delay to bring suit, at the special request of the executer or administrator, that then and in that case the said debt or demand shall not be barred during the time of such indulgence." In the case of Trott y. West, 9 Yerg, 433 ; S. C. Meigs, 163, the request was to delay "for a short time," with a promise "to pay soon," accompanied by a partial payment. It was held not to comply with the requirements of this statute, the court saying: "The proviso clearly means that the special request shall stipulate for special delay, for a definite time of indulgence, dur- ing which the statute shall not bar the claim." In Puckett v. James, 2 Humph. 564, the testator owed a debt for certain land he had pur- chased, and the executer requested another crediter to delay a debt due him "until the land was paid for," which he agreed to do. The court held that this was for a definite time of indulgence : �"Kot, to be sure," says the court, "for a particular length of time named in the request, but for the time that might elapse until he could accomplish a certain event named and stipulated in the request. There is nothing vague or indefinite in the period here flxed, for, if the land were paid for, the statute would run f rom that period in the same way that it would if a particular day of a specified year had been named." �By this decision it was first adjudged that the definite time to be deducted may be measured by the occurrence of some event agreed upon as the basis of such measurement. In McWhirter v. Jackson, 10 Humph. 209, there was this indorsement on the claims : "The within account is accepted, and will be paid when means sufficient corne te my hands." The circuit court charged the jury that this was sufiicient under the statutes; but on writ ef errer the supreme court affirmed the judgment solely on the ground that by the promise the administrator had made himself personally liable, having admitted that he had collected money enough to pay the judgment; the court holding that the case was not governed by the act of 1789. In the case of Bank v. Leath, 11 Humph. 515, the request made by the exec- uters was that the crediter should not sue "until they could procure a statement of the account between the testator and the bank ; " and this was held te be a stated event and sufficient. In McKizzack y. Smith, 1 Sneed, 470, the administrator requested delay, and promised to pay "as soon as money enough should be eollected;" and at another time, "as soon as Joseph Miller could collect some money." The ��� �
