IN BE CABY. 627 �236; People v. Brower, 4 Paige, 4.05; Haring v. Kauffman, 2 Beas. 397 ; In re Feeny, 4 N. B. E. 233. In all these cases it either plainly appeared or was admitted that the persons proceeded against had full knowledge of the injunction, and either disobeyed it before the order was entered, or concealed themselves to evade service, or were out of the state where they were duly notified; and in several of the cases full notice of the injunction was given in writing, although there was no technical service of a copy of the order itself. �In the present case both Youmans and Prentiss, his attorney, were at their usual places of business during all the time from the grant- ing of the ex parte order of injunction until the levy on the! twenty- fifth of February, more than six weeks; yet no attempt was ever made either to serve them or to notify either of them of this injunc- tion. Upon this hearing they both swear positively that the first knowledge they had of it was when the order to show cause for its violation was served upon them about February 2Sth. The evidence that Youmans had any knowledge of it is at best very indefinite and unsatisfactory. As regards Prentiss, there is some evidence of his knowledge of it through Taylor; but he swears that he did not read the order at the time it was handed him by Taylor, and lost it on his way to the office. If there had ever been any endeavors to serve or notify Youmans or Prentiss directly, such an alleged loss of the paper, though possible, would not be favorably considered. Nor can knowl- edge of an injunction order by an attorney be imputed to his princi- pal, 80 as to sustain proceedings for contempt against the latter. Satterlee v. De Comeau, 7 Robt. 666; In re SouthsideB. E. 10 N. B. E. 274. �The moving papers also are defective as respects Youmans in not averring that he ever had either service or any knowledge of the injunction, in fact, or had ever done any act in known violation of it. This is a vital defect ; Youmans has done nothing to waive this objection, and it is as available now as upon the refcurn of the order to show cause. �But, in denying this motion as to them, I prefer to place my de- cision upon the broader ground that those who procure an ex parte injunction, and make no efforts to serve it upon the persons who they claim shall be bound by it, though they are easily accessible, are not entitled to proceed for contempt upon any accidentai, doubtful, and disputed notice of the injunction alleged to have been conveyed in- directly only through other persons. Parties designed to be bound by an injunction have a right to expect service in the ordinary way, ��� �
