MEMGIS V. LEBANON MANUf'g CO. 665 �Mengis and others v. Lebanon Manuf'g Co.* �[Oircuit Court, S. D. New York. January 24, 1882.) �1. Veudict — Whbn CouiiT wiLL Set Aside. �It is only where it is so palpable that the jury have erred as to suggeat the prohahility that the verdict was the resuit of misapprehension or partiality, that ihc court will interfere to set aside the verdict. It is not enough that the judge might have arrived at a different conclusion, nor that thcre may have been a strong preponderance of evidence in f avor of the defeated party. �Motion to Set Aside Verdict. �Wallace, D. J. As one of the questions of fact in this case, the jury were called on to decide whether tiie plaintiff understood Mr. Meily to have general authority to represent the defendant in making a contraet for the sale of cars, or understood him to be a broker for the defendant in the particular transaction. There was undoubtedly cogent evidence to show that the defendant's ofiBcers held Meily ont to the plaintiffs as having general authority to bind the defendant in making such a contraet ; but, on the other hand, there was explicit testimony to the effect that the officers of the defendant had told one of the plaintiSs very recently that Meily was not their agent; that they wonld not appoint any agent; and that they acted, and intended to act, personally in such transactions. It was also fairly inferable, from the fact that plaintiffs asked for evidence of Meily's authority, that they were not satisfied to treat with him as a general agent without the proof of his agency. It was a question of credibility of witnesses whether such written authority was or was not fumished by Meily. There was also indicia in the transaction which might justify an inference that the plairitifis and Meily were co-operating together more with a view to securing commissions for themselves than to obtain a satisfaetory contraet for the defendant. Upon the whole case, therefore, I am of opinion that a case is not made which would justify setting aside the verdict. It is not enough that the judge might have arrived at a different conclusion, nor even that there may have been a strong preponderance of evidence in favor of the defeated party. It is only where it is so palpable that the jury have erred as to suggest the probability that the verdict was the result of misapprehension or partiality, that the court will interfere. �Motion denied. �See Bi'mti v. Memphis e C. Tt. Co. 7 Fed. Rkp. 51.
- Rcpoi ted by S. Nelson Whitc, Ksq., of the New York bar.
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