UNITED STATES V. BUNTIN. 731 �Bchoo] lioartls of two or more adjoining districts may imite in establish- ing a separate school for colored children, and under color of a regula- tion exciuding colored children. �The testimony showed that there was no sehool for colored chil- dren in the subdistrict in which the proseouting witness resided. The school for white children was situated about three miles from bis house. The township board of 'education had established a separate school for the colored children of the township, under the provisions of section 4008 of the Revised Statutes of Ohio, which is as f ollows : �« When, in the judgment of the board, it will be for the advantiige of the district to do so, it may organize separate schools for colored children. The boards of two or more adjoining districts may unite in a separate school for colored children, each board to bear its proportionate share of the expense of such school according to the nuraber of colored children from each district in the school, which shall be under the control of the board of education of the district in which the school is situated." �This school was located about five miles from the prosecuting wit- ness' home. �The other facts appear in the opinion. �Channing Richards, U. S. Dist. Atty., for prosecution. �John Johnston and H. J. Buntin, contra. �Baxter, C. J., {charging jury.) Mach has been said and quite an array of books produced to prove that a criminal intent is a necessary ingredient of every crime. The proposition, when properly under- stood, is correct. But what is a criminal intent? This depends Bomewhat upon the nature of the crime with which the accused is charged. The decision by Judge Eives, which has been read to the court in your hearing, was made in a case in which a jury commis- sioner was indicted for exciuding colored persons from servingas jurors. The essence of the crime, in that case, consisted in the exclusion of colored men from serving as jurors on account of their color. They might have been excluded for the want of sufficient intelligence, or other good and valid reason; and, if so, the defendant would not have been guilty. Hence the motive actuating the accused became a material inquiry. His motive was the principal ele- ment of the crime, and it was incumbent on the government to prove the unlawful intent, which in that case constituted the of- fence, before a conviction could be lawf ully demanded. The same may be said in relation to many other crimes. The crime of passing coun- terfeit money consists in the passing of it with a knowledge of its spurious eharacter. If passed without such knowledge there would ��� �
