I38 FEDERAL REPORTBB �3. Civil Ekgiits Act of Maroh 1, 1875. Senator Sunmer's civil rights bill (act of March 1, 1875; 18 St. at Large, 336) provides " that all per- sons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land and water, theaters, aud otlier places of public amusement, subject only to the conditions and limit- ation established by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude." It is apparent that tins enactment attempts to secare rights that corne from the states, and which are not, therefore, covered by the second clause of the fourteentli amendment. which prohibits the states from abridging the "privileges or iminunities of citizeiis of the Unilld States." The decisions of the supreme court of the United States, above referred to, wouldseem to havesettled that boththisand the succeeding clauses of the amendment are directed only against action by some of the agencies of the state, and do not reaeh the conduct of private individuals, leaving that for adjustment by the state. In its application to for- eign and Interstate commerce it is submitted that the provision is within the power granted congress to regulate commerce. Hall v. Be Cuir, 95 U. S. 485, 490. A short time after the passage of the civil rights act of 1875, Judge Emmons held that the inhibitions of the fourteenth amendment were aimed only at the action of the state, and have no reference to individuals ; that the right to " the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of theaters and inns" come from the state, and the protection of that right is not witliin the power of congress, and that, therefore, the civil rights act is to that extent unconstitutional. Charge to Grand Jury, (May, 1875, U. S. C. C, W. D. Tenu.) 2 Am. L. T. Kep. (N. S.) 198. The reasoning of this eminent judge appears to be altogether satisfac- toiy and conelusive. The same question was presented to Judges Blatchford and Choate, and they divided and certified it to the supreme court. U. S. v. Singleton, 1 Crim. Law Mag. 386. Judge Cadwalader held that the provisions of the act forbidding and punishing discriminations in the use of inns, theaters, public conveyances, etc., on the ground of color, were a warranted exercise of the legislative power vested in congress by the fourteenth amend- ment, and that a clerk in charge of an inn, who refuses accommodations to a traveler on the ground of lus color, is liable to indictment and punishment under the act. U. 8. v. Neiocomer, (U. S. D. C, E. D. Pa. Feb. 1876,) 22 Int. Eev. Rec. 115. The opinion is little more than an announcement of this con- clusion, without stating the reasons therefor. These decisions still leave it uncertain liow far the act can be sustained as coming within the powers granted congress by the constitution and its amendments. Eor a clear and thoughtful discussion of the question see Judge Cooley's work on Torts, pages 284-6. In an indictment and in a civil action for penalty, under the civil rights act of March 1, 1875, the citizenship of the person injured must be alleged and proved. U. 8. v. Taylor, 3 Fed. Rep. 563 ; Lewis v. Hitohoock, 10 FED. Rep. 4 ; 13 Rep. 299. What is an " inn " within the terms of the act, and what is a sufflcient pleading in an action for penalty for the deniai of the privileges thereof, see Lewis v Hitchcock, supra. Section 4 of the act of March 1, 1875, providing that no person shall be disqualifled to serve ��� �
