Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 2.djvu/655

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C48 FEDERAL EBPOETEE. �based on these transactions. The opposing crediter, however, haa not offered evidence in this proceeding of the alleged false entries in the books. He has oiïered the judgment roll in said suit for fraud, which involves, as he claims, a conolusive determination of this fact of false entries. He has also offered secondary evidence of what was proved upon the trial in said action. To ail this evidence the bankrupts have objected. , Christie first recovered a judgment after a trial on the merits, establishing the fraud, and on the trial evidence of the false entries in the books was given as part of the plain- tifs proofs, although the eomplaint did not allege the false entries in the books, but false accounts rendered and other fraudulent practices. This judgment was, however, set aside and a new trial was ordered, and when the cause came on for trial again the bankrupts suffered default, and judgment was taken against them oh their default. The first judgment having been set aside concludes nobody. It is olear, also, as matter of law, that, even if the eomplaint had alleged the false entries in the books, the judgment recovered by default would not be evidence of the truth of the allegations in the eom- plaint in another proceeding, on another cause of action, as this proceeding for a discharge must be considered. "A judg- ment by default only admits for, the purpose of the action the legality of the demand or claim in suit ; it does not make the allegations of the declaration or eomplaint evidence in an action upon a different claim." Cromwell v. County ofSac, 94 U. S. 356. �Still less is the judgment conclusive evidence coUaterally of facts, of whieh evidence was offered in the course of the trial, in support of the allegations of the declaration or eomplaint. The secondary evidence of the entries in the books, as put in proof on the trial, was also clearly incompetent, and cannot be considered as any proof of the specification of false en- tries in the bankrupt's books, or of bis keeping improper books. The papers make it highly probable that these speci- fications, or one of them, could be proved, but the opposing creditors bave chosen to rely on modes of proof which are ����