6TATB V. POET. 117 �eoon as such appointaient is made iiîs term under the circuit justice ends, and there is a vacancy in the of&ce, which is simultaneously filled by the appointment which creates it. To say that the power given tha circuit justice, to fill a va- cancy until the president appoints, precludes the president from making the appointment, is, it seems to me, a very un- warranted construction of the statuts. The meaning is clear. No paraphrase can make it clearer. The circuit justice may fill the vacancy, and the appointee holds under him until the president appoints the same or some other person. The term under the circuit justice then ceases, and the appointee holds, from that tima on, under the appointment of the president. My conclusion is, therefore, that, upon the agreed facts, the term of Farrow, under the appointment of the circuit justice, ended as soon as the president appointed Bigby and he was duly qualified, and that Bigby is entitled to the possession of the office. ���State v. Pobt and otherg. {Circuit Court, If. D. Oeorgia. July, 1880.) �l. Kemovai, — Criminai, Prosecution — Rev. St. } 643.— A criminal pros- ecuilon is commenced, within the meaning of section 643 of the Re- vised Statutea, relating to the removal of such prosecution from a State to a federal court, as soon as a warrant has been issued. �% Court — Justice dp the Pbace — Constiïutiok of Georgia, Art. 6, i 1. — Under the constitution of the state of Georgia (art. 6, § 1) a jus- tice of the peace is an ofBcer clothed with judicial powers, when act- ing in his judicial capacity, and within his jurisdiction is, to ail intenta and purposes, a court, before whom a criminal prosecution can be law- fully commenced. �Petition for Eemoval. �On the second day of July, 1880, an affidavit was made by Mary E. Jones before John B. Suttles, Jr., a justice of the peace of Campbell county, Georgia, charging that on. June 24th last, at said county, the defendant, A. W. Port, and 12 ����
