WETMORE V. ST. P. St P. B. 00. 181 �poses finally of millions of property — a decree under wMch the purchasers were to take possession and get a final deed, and under which they would enter upon the management of the property and create new rights, by bonds and all that sort of thing — who ever supposed that such a decree as that was to stand for nothing more than a mere preliminary or in- terlocutory order, which the court could set aside at any time that, in its judgment, sufScient reasons for not confirm- ing the sale should be brought to bear ? It is much more in conformity with reason, with precedent, and common sense, to believe that the "further orders" referred to here are such orders as might be necessary for the distribution of the funds as between the parties, and the payment of the bonds which had to corne in, and which might be disputed as to their own- ership — probably for the delivery of the possession, (for I do not see anything in this decree which requires the delivery of the possession,) probably for the making of a deed, (for I do not see anything here about the making of a deed.) There are fifty things you can imagine which would be consistent with the confirmation of the sale, and which might yet require further orders of the court. I have not the slightest idea that after all the consideration and all the trouble that pre- ceded the sale, and all the parties coming in and agreeing to sell, and consenting to it, that the court simply said: "We confirm this sale, subject to the setting aside of the confirma- tion whenever we think proper." Such a thing would be plainly against the interests of the purchasers, as well as against the interests of -the parties. I therefore think there is nothing whatever in that order which justifies the inter- ference that is asked in this case. �On the whole, then, we are of the opinion that there is no principle or precedent which wouldwarrant these petitioners being made parties to this suit with a view of making such motion in the case. �In the next place we are of opinion that this order is not to be construed as extending to any such relief as is asked by these petitioners. �We perhaps ought to stop there. I understand that a bill ����
