862 FEDERAL REPORTER. �■wîthîn the meanîng of the contract clause of the constitution of the United States. Constitution, art. 1, § 10. �It only remains to be determined -whether the act of 1879, passed after this suit waa brought, impairs the obligation of the pre-existing contract. Upon this point there can scarcely be a doubt. The last act repeals the former, and substitutes for it a provision which, if yalid, absolutely deprives the plaintiff of his vested rights. By the law under which plain- tiff invested his money he was to bave a retum of his money and interest if the sale was found to be irregular or invalid. By the act of 1879 he has no right to the retum of hia money in any case, unless the board of supervisors shall see proper to so order. It requires no argument to show that, where a valid debt exists under a contract, an act of the leg- islature declaring that it shall be paid only at the option of the debtor is a void act. �The general doctrine that a state may, by legislative enact- ment, enter into a binding contract, the obligation of which Cannot be impaired by subsequent legislation, is well settled. Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87; New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranoh, 164, 166; Dartmouth College Case, 4 Wheat. 518; Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. 369; Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203; Tennessee v. Sneed, 96 U. S. 69; Keith v. Clark, 97 U. S. i54. �In Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595, it was held that the remedy subsisting in a state when and where the contract is made, and is to be performed, is a part of the obligation; and any subsequent law of the state, which so affects that remedy as Bubstantially to impair and lessen the value of the con- tract, is forbidden by the constitution of the United States, and therefore void. The act of 1879, now under considera- tion, certainly impairs, substantially, if it doea not absolutely destroy, the remedy given by the previous law, and it must, therefore, be held to be void, in so far as it purports to apply to pending cases and to affect existing vested rights. It is competent for the legislature to modify, but not to destroy or impair, the remedy. Tennessee v. Sneed, supra. �2. Section 146, e. 84, Laws 1876, quoted above, provides ihat if, after the conyeyance of land sold for taxes, it shall ����
