888 PBDBBAL BEPOBTBB. �Baid probate court of Goodhue county, and by virtue of such appointment the guardian proceeded to sell and convey cer- tain real estate of the said minor. The bill is filed to set aside this conveyanoe npon the ground that the appointment of the guardian was absolutely void, and also to remove the cloud from the complainant's title caused by the execution and recording of the gùardian's deed. �The demurrer raises the question whether the proceedinga of the probate court, upon the petition for the appointment" of a guardian for said minor, amount to an adjudication ■which cànnot be attacked in a collateral proceeding. It is said that the probate court of Goodhue county had jurisdic- tion to entertain the application, and to decide the question of fact as to the residence of the minor, and that, having decided that question, and made the appointment, its judg- ment is conclusive upon the minor and all persons claiming under her. The petition, it is said, stated the necessary jurisdietional f acts, and the .probate court conclusively passed upon them when it made the appointment. The rule of laiv upon this subject is familiar. An erroneous act or judgment, by a court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties, can be reviewed and corrected only by a tribunal having appellate jurisdiction. When brought in question collaterally or incidentally, it is to be regarded aa conclusive upon all parties to it, as well as upon their privies. On the other hand, the act or judgment of a tribunal having no cog- nizance of the subject-matter is absolutely nuU and void, and inay be impeached in any court, either directly or collaterally. �Within which definition does the present case fall? There is often great difficulty in drawing the precise line of distinc- tion between such acts as are void and such as are voidable only ; but the line exists, and vire must locate it as best wa can, Perhaps the safest guide in determining the question, 80 far as the present case is concerned, will be found in the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in Griffith v. Frazier, 8 Cranch, 9. In that case it appeared that an administrator, duly appointed to administer an estate in South Carolina, had absented himself from that state, whereupon the ordi- ����
