tJNITED STATk's V. WILLIAMS. iSS �hereby declared to be non-mailable matter. * • • : And any person who shall, knowingly, deposit, oi cause to be de- posited, for mailing or delivery, anything declared by this sec- tion to be non-mailable matter, * * • shall be deemed guilty," etc. �The particular act complained of is the depositing in the mail of the Greenpoint station, Brooklyn, on or about Sep- tember 23, 1879, an obscene and indecent letter, enclosed in an envelope, addressed to Mr. George Eowland, of Green- point. . " �Several questions are involved in this case : Is the letter re- ferred to obscene or indecent ? Is it such an One as is embra;Ced by the statute ? Was it deposited in the mail ? And is the evi- dence such as to justify the belief that the defendant violatedthe statute as alleged ? The letter is evidently obscene and inde- cent. Obscene matter is that which tends to deprave and corrupt the morals of those whose minds are open to such influences. This is the test given by Chief Justice Cock- burne in Regina v. Hicklin, (L. K. 3 Q. B. 360,) and adopted in later cases (U. S. v. Bennett, S. D. N. Y. 1879.) In the case of Heywood, (Mass.,) an obscene writing was defined as one offensive to decency, indelicate, impure, and an indecent one, as one unbecoming, immodest, unfit to be seen. Applying these tests, it is manifest that the letter in question is both obscene and indecent. �The proof of deposit in the mail consista of the postmark upon the envelope, and the testimony of the post-office officiais. Both the English and American courts have held that postmarks afford presumptive proof of deposit in the mail, and, although some effort has been made to show that these postmarks might have been affixed otherwise than by the postal officiais, there is sufficient evidence that the letter was deposited in the mail as charged. �The question next to be considered is whether the letter referred to is shown by the evidence to be within the scope of the law. The olïence charged is statutory, and the deter- mination of this question depends upon the construction to be given to the statute upon which the charge is based. I ����
