, £LAOEBi;SIf V. S. B. 00. , 693 �in 1842, so far as itis coasistent witii "our local circiam- Btances and conveniences." In Tennessee, before confirma- tion,, the rule is now settled that a simple advance of 10 per centum, without any circumstances whatever of fraud, acci- dent or mistake, sliall be sufficient to open the biddings, and that the practice must be liberally applied to effeotuate the purpose of procuring the largest possible prioe. Clkk v. Bur- ris, 6 Heisk. 539 ; Glenn v. Glenn, Y Heisk. 367 ; Lucas v. Moore, 2 Lea. 1; Atkison v. Murfree, 1 Tenn. Ch. 51; Insurance Cp. V. Hamilton, 3 Tenn. Ch. 228 ; Vaughan v. Smith, Id. 368 ; Atchison v. Murfree, Id. 728. �In England, before the new practice was adopted, a third person could, npon no other ground than that he offered an advance of price, provided it were a considerable advance, intervene and set the sale aside, he pajing ail the expensea which the previous purchaser had incurred, and the property was put up for sale upon the advance price. There was no rule as to the amount of the advance required, and no one had. any right to open the biddings, since it was always in the discretion of the court to grant the application or refuse it. 1 Sug, Yend. (8th Am. Ed.) 163; 2 Daul. Ch. Pr. (5th Am. Ed.) 1286; Barlowe v. Osborne, 6 House of Lords Cases, 555, 559; Garstone v. Edwards, 1 Sim. & Stu. 20; BrookfieJd v. Bradley, Id. 23; Watson v. Birch, 2 Ves. 51; S. C. 4 Bro. G. R. 178; Upton V. Lord Fenus, Id. 700 ; Andrews v. Emerson, 7 Bro. 0. E. 420 ; Morice v. The Bishop ofDurJiam, 11 Bro. C. E. 67 ; White T. Wilson, 14 Bro. C. E. 151; Farlow v. Weildon, 4 Madà. 243; Williams v. AUenborough, 1 Tenn. Euss, 70; Anon. 1 Ves. 453, and notes. �These authorities abundantly establish that an advance of price as great as that oefered in this case always sufficed to set the sale aside and order a resale, no matter how fairly conducted it had been. It was this practice that was so severely condemned by the English courts as inexpedient, ruinous and unjust, and the law lords, in Barlowe v. Osborne, supra, expressed the wish that occasion would be taken, either by act of parliament or by order of court, to put a stop to it, which, as we have seen, was afterwards done. And, under ����
