BLACEBDBN V. S. B. 00. 695 �erty, and, therefore, the sale of the Aberdeen bonds oannot be set aside unless there be alleged and proved some circumstanco of unfairness arising out of fraud, accident, mistake, or trust relation of the parties. The argument is that as to personal property confirmation of the sale by the court is not neces- sary ; that the title passes when the property is struck ofif to the bidder, and, therefore, the sale stands before confirmation as a sale of land does after confirmation ; in which case, it is now well settled by the authorities above cited, that there must be, besides an advance, some other eircumstances mak- ing the sale unfair, and for which it will be set aside. Morice T. The Bishop of Durham, and White v. Wilson, supra; 4 Kent, 192, (12th Ed.) �The case relied on to support this position is Saunders v. Stallings, 6 Heisk. 65, where Chief Justice Nicholson says: "In the sales of personal property under decrees of the chan- cery court it has become the settled law of the state that the title to the property passes to the purchasers^ as soon as the contract is completed, by his bid being accepted by the mas- ter." It was a case of loss by fire of some bouses and ma- chinery to be detached from the realty that were sold by the master, and burned before confirmation, the loss being thrown by the decision on the vendee. In Johnson v. Johnson, 2 Heisk. 522, the same learned judge reviews the authorities in Tennessee, says theyare not uniform, and rules that the loss by emancipation of slaves between sale and confirmation must be on the vendor. And so he subsequently ruled in Jones V. Hollingsworth, 10 Heisk. 653. Mr. Chancellor Cooper, in Atkison v. Murfree, 1 Tenn. Ch. 51, 54, calla attention to the unsettled condition of the law on this point in this state, and says that the latest decisions relating to sales of personalty seem to restore the symmetry of the law, and make the title depend on confirmation. Page 54. In Blossom V. Eailroad Co. 8 Wall. 196, 207, the supreme court affirms what is said by Judge Story in Smith v.^ Arnold, 5 Mason, 414, 420, that in sales directed by a court of chancery the whole business is transacted by a public officer, under the ^uidance and superintendence of the court itself. Even after ����
