SBANI» V. UNITED STATES. eOl �intended to raîse the point as to the sufficiency of the evidence to show that the defendant deposited, or caused to be depos- ited, iu the post-office at Malone the newspapers containing the published notice. Tt does not appear that ail the evi- dence is set forth, and tJie remarks before made apply to this branch of the case. �The defendant requested the court to instruci the jury (3) "that there is no evidence upon which the jury oan find that the defendant reeeived any letter or letters from any post- office of the United States, in violation of the laws of the United States, for which he is liable on this trial;" and (4) "that under the indictment in this case defendant cannot be convicted of receiving any letter from any post -office, in vio- lation of the laws of the United States." �These requests were each of them refused and each request was excepted to. The bill of exceptions then states : "The court thereupon charged the jury, among other things, as foUows : He read to them section 5480 of the Eevised Stat- utes, and instructed the jury that the fact that some person had devised a scheme to defraud, to be effected through the agency of the post-office, had been established to such extent that they were authorized to find the case, as to that ele- ment, made out; that the important question was whether this defendant devised it and mailed the letter containing the advertisement to the publishers of the Malone Palladium, and reeeived the answers to the advertisement, and unless they found against the defendant upon this question he could not be convicted; that, if he was the person who had done this, he was within the provisions of the statute ; that it was not necessary that the letter should be personally mailed or personally reeeived from the post-office by the defendant, in order to warrant a conviction ; if he caused or procured the letter to be mailed, that was sufficient; that the defendant Btarted with the presumption of innocence and was entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt; that he could not be convicted unless the evidence was such as was not only con- sistent with guilt, but inoonsistent with innocence ; that as to �T.4,no.5— 28 ����
