751 FEDERAL REPORTER. �vending thereîn any of the articles, goods, or merchandise denomi- nated hazardous or extra hazardous or specially hazardous, * * * printed on the back of this policy, ***** then and from thenceforth, so long as the same shall be so appropriated, applied, or nsed, this policy shall cease, and be of no force or eSect." �Hdd, that " burning fluid " did not necessarily mean any fluid that would burn, when " burning fluid " was classed as " specially hazard- ous " under such provision. �A Saub — Same— Naphtha. — HeZd, further, that the policy was only sus- pended under such clause while the forbidden use of naphtha contin- ued, and that it revived when such use ceased. �7. Same — Same — Evidence. — Evidence of a conversation in relation to a surrendered policy of insurance is admissible in order to prove knowl- edge of an insurance company'g agent of other insurance upon the issue of a subsequent policy. �&. Bame — Same— Same. — Evidence ia admissible to show that the assured did not read the policy at the time it was delivered to him, In order to prove that a mistake was made in the writing of the policy. �Motion for a New Trial. �Edward C. Bisley, for plaintiff, �James B. Perkins, for defendants. �BiiATOHFORD, C. J. 1. Tho defendants contend that the •evidence shows that the insured property was burned by the fraudulent practices of the assured. The question is one of fact. The referee bas found that the fire arose "from some cause unknown." His finding will not be disturbed except in a case where the finding of a jury on the same question would be disturbed. This is not such a case. On the contrary, on the evidence, a finding that the property was burned by the fraudulent practices of the assured would be set aside by the court. �2. The defendants contend that the plaintiff, througb his authorized agent, was guilty of fraud in swearing to and pre- senting the proofs and claim that he did, in respect to the value of the goods burned. The evidence does not establish that the plaintiff knew that the goods were worth less than the value of them stated in the proofs of loss. �The referee has found, in the first case, that the value of the goods at the time of the fire was "upwards of $12,000," and, in the second case, that their value at that time was ����
