180 FEDERAL REPORTBB. �charter-party in -which the owner contracted that the vessel ehould proceed ■without delay to Baltimore to enter upon an engagement to carry grain, she was engaged in an employ- ment, of which no intimation waa given to the charterers, •which could not be reasonably expected to terminate for 30 days; and bef ore Bhe could be f reed from that employment and be made ready for sea there would in all probability be a delsiy of from 30 to 40 days. ' �. I am unable to see, in the instrument itself, or in the sit- uation of the parties, anything to lead me to think that such a delay was vithin the intention of the parties, or is within the terms of the contract. The stipulation for the right to load a cargo of coals as ballast ratlier favors the idea that the vessel waa ready to take ballast aboard and enter upon the voyage; and as it is well known that coals could hardly, under any circumstances, be a profitable cargo to bring from Genoa to Baltimore, it may well be that when the charterers consented to that stipulation they counted upon no more eoals being put aboard than would suffice for ballast, or that she had then on board from her previous voyage. The per- mission to take a cargo of ooal as ballast was, therefore, by no means equivalent to permission to discharge a cargo of coal. It would be, I think, unwarrantably enlarging the terms of the contract to so construe it as to allow the vessel permis- sion to consume all the time necessary to discharge one cargo of coals and to take on board another, — operations requiring at that port not less than two months. It is a matter of general knowledge that, in charter-parties to carry grain, time is a more essential element in the ealculation of the charterer than in other contracts for the use of vessels, and it would seem only fair dealing that such an obstacle as existed in this case to the possibility of the vessel proceeding without delay should have been made known to the charterers. �I have been unable to satisfy myself that the vessel did proceed without delay, as stipulated, and I will sign a decree dismissing the libel. �Note. Bee Von Lingen v. Baviaaon, 1 Eed. Rbp. 178, and 4 Fed. Rep. 348. ����
