HAMILTON V. BARK KATE IRVING. 633
safe, to carry hoop iron stowed in such close proximity to it. On the contrary, such testimony as has been produced in this case on that subject tended to show the contrary.
The libellants' case is, it seems to me, a stronger one than Mainwaring v. Bark Carrie Delap, 1 Fed. Rep. 874, in which Judge Choate, upon the facts proved before him, held the ship liable for injury to empty grain bags caused by the fumes of bleaching powders carried as part of a general cargo.
There was in the bill of lading for the cotton ties an exception by which the ship was not to be accountable for damage from perils of the sea or from rust; but, as I have already indicated, the libellants have, in my judgment, sustained the burden of showing that the damage was not ordinary rust, but was a corroding caused by contact with a destructive chemical, and resulted from the negligence of the carrier, and that without that negligence the rough weather would not have caused the injury. No water touched the ties, and their position was not shifted. The injury resulted solely from the bleaching powder getting on to them. Richards v. Hansen, (The Svend) 1 Fed. Rep. 54.
With regard to the amount of damage I have had some difficulty. There was produced for the libellants the testimony of several merchants dealing in iron, whose evidence went to show that the market value of about one-half of the cotton ties was diminished 50 per cent, by the damage they had sustained. The custom-house officials, in appraising the goods for duties, estimated that one-half had been damaged to the extent of 40 per cent., and allowed that rebate from the invoice price in collecting the duties. It appears, however, that the libellants had intended to sell this importation through their commission merchants, and did sell through them, and that after cleaning and repainting some of the hoops, and by making some extra exertion and selling them in smaller lots, the commission merchants succeeded in disposing of them at prices not very much below the full market price for perfect merchantable goods.
Undoubtedly, the proper measure of damage in such cases is the difference between the market value of sound and the
