866 . FEDERAL REPOS'JEE. �had been only paftially collected. Those taxes were, in a most legitimate Saiise, oharged with a trust, and a trust for the complainants. The fand to be raised by the levies was set apart for a special purpose. It could be used lawfully for no other. The ordinances which directed the levies spec- ified the amounts to be raised, and the judgment creditera for Tyhose use the levies were made. Those creditors were, therefore, cestuis que trust. in the fullest sense of the term, the legal interest alone being in the city. The case shows that this trust had been neglected and abused by the trustee. The taxes whioh it was the duty of the city as trustee to col- leot had been suffered to remain uncoUected in great meas- ure, and for an unreasonable time, and even the portions •vrkich were coUected had not been paid over, as the writs of mandamus required. This breach of duty by the trustee had continued from 1875 to 1879. Had the trustee been a natural person, or a private corporation, no one would doubt the power of a court of equity to interfere and take the trust Qut of the hands of the faithless trustee, either by removing him and appointing another trustee, or by administerii^ the trust by ita own officers. It can make no difference that the city of Memphis was a municipal corporation. Its character as such does not affect the nature of its obligations to its creditors or its cestuis que trust, or impair the remedies they would have if the city was a common debtor or trustee. "While as a municipal corporation the city had public duties to perform, in eontracting debts authorized by the law of its organization, or in performing a private trust, it is regarded by the law as standing on the same footing as a private indi- vidual, with the same rights and duties, and with the same liabilities, as attend such persons. Over its public duties, it may be admitted, the legislature has plenary authority. Over its private obligations it has not. Bailey v. The Mayor of New York, 3 Hill, 539; Small v. Banville, 51 Me. 361; Oliver v. Worcester, 120 Mass. 502; Dillon on Municipal Corporations, § 39, and cases cited in the notes. �Moreover, if, as contended by the appellants, the city of Memphis ceased to have any legal existence on the thirty-first ����
