FCLLEa V. FLETCHER, 131 �claims that inasmuch as the verdict was rendered upon the general issue, solely and exclusively, it should be set aside if it is shown that upon the evidence in the cause, relevant and proper under the general issue, (excluding from consideration whatever was admissible or admitted under a special pie a of possession,) the verdict is unwarranted. This, in my judg- ment, is satisfactorily shown. �And here I am aware that with the approval of one of the parties, but not to the gratification of his antagonist, and in accordance with the practice of some of my brethren of the bench, I might here indulge in an argumentative review of the whole case, involving of course a recapitulation of much of the testimony submitted, an analysis and exposition of much of a large mass of documentary evidence, with remarks and suggestions touching the admissibility and positive and relative weight of that evidence upon the issues raised and contested, and might superadd to these such eritical remarks in vindication of my rulings as might seem to me pertinent, appi"obatory or otherwise, of the antagonistic utterances ar- guendo of the learned counsel of the parties rospectivelyL But from this I refrain, as in this case, manif estly, a work of supererogation, profiting no one, and of interest to none but the learned counsel, if even to them. Of the soundnesa or unsoundness of the conclusions to which I have arrived upon the motion pending, they, the counsel, are alone qualified to judge, and they alone, it is probable, will ever form, enter- tain, or express an opinion upon this point. Unanimity on their part, even were it desirable, is not reasonably to be expected, no matter how elaborate and persuasive the argu- ment the court might submit in support of its oonclusions. �Finding and ruling that upon the first ground the plaintiff is entitled to a new trial, upon the second and third grounds I express no opinion. �The verdict is eet aside and a new trial granted. ��� �
