CNITED STATES V. WATKINDS. ���167 ���the value of the matter in dispute is measured by the amount of the judgment against him, whUe in the case of the plain- tiff it is measured by the amount of the claim or charge. Gordon v. Ogden, 3 Pet. 33; Knapp v. Banks, 2 How. 73; Ryan v. BendUy, 1 Wall. 66; Walker v. U. S. 4 Wall. 163. �In People v. War, 20 Cal. 117, the question of the right of appeal in criminal cases came up again, and the court held (p. 120) that the statute definition of a felony — a public ofFence punishable by death or imprisonment in a state prison — included any offence which may be or is liable to such punishment ; and that although the offence charged in an indictment inay, in the discretion of the court, be pun- ished simply by a fine, still it is a felony, and an appeal will lie by the people from a judgment sustaining a demurrer thereto. In noticing People v. Cornell, the court said the jurisdiction of the appeal was denied in that case upon the ground that "the nature and estent of the punishment fixed the right of the appeal" by the defendant. �In People v. Apgar, 35 Cal. 389, the defendant was indicted for an assault amounting to a felony, and convicted and sen- tenced for a simple assault. He appealed upon the ground that the cbaracter of the offence charged gave jurisdiction, but the appeal was dismissed upon the ground that he was aoquitted of the felony and only convicted of a misdemeanor, and that therefore the case on appeal did not amount to a felony; and in referring to People v. Cornell, the court said it was held therein that the judgment determined the oharacter of the case for the purpose of an appeal. The efiect of the decision, then, in People v. Cornell, as I understand it, and as interpreted in both the cases of War and Apgars goes no further than that, unless the judgment in a criminal case imposed the punishment prescribed for a felony, the defendant cannot have the benefit of an appeal from it. But the question in this case is not whether the defendant bas been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor, but whether he bas been "con- victed" of a crime "which is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary," And the fact that a subsequent stat- ute (Or. Cr. Code, § 3) has declared a crime "which is or ��� �
