UNITED STATBS V. WATEINDS. 169 �tiiat sentence bas been pronouncJed, but only that the verdict has been returned. So a jdea of guilty by the defendant coustitutes a conviction ofbitn." ' �Mr. Justice Story, in 17. & v, Gibert, 2 Suiu: 40, while con- sidering the maxim, "No maii is io be brought into jeopardy of hislife more than once for the same offence," said: "Convic- tioii does not mean the judgment-passed upon the verdict;" and in the same case held that a plea of autrefois convict — a former conviction — willbe sustained by a confession or ver- dict, even when there bas been no judgment ; citing 2 Hawk. P. C. C.36; §§ 1, 10. �■ In People r. Goldestin, 32 Cal. 432, it was held that a plea of guilty upon whioh no judgment was given was nevertheleas a conviction, and would therefore Bustain a plea of former cbnvictibn to an indictment for the same offence. And the verjr statute under which the defendant was indicted uses the term in the same sense. It provides that any person, "upon conviction" of the crime therein defined, shall be punished as the court, within certain limits, may thereafter direct or adjudge by its sentence or judgment. �3ut, while thi's is the primary and usual meaning of the term -" conviction, "it is possible that it may be used in such a connection and under such circumstances as to have a sec- bndary or unusual meaning, which would include the final judgment of the court. Bish. St. Cr. § 348; Whar. Cr. P.«& P. § 935. Yet in Stevens v. People, 1 iiill, 261, it was held sufficient, in an indictment for a second larceny, to allege a prior conviction of the defendant, without averring that there was any judgment or sentence pronounced against him; but the contrary appears to have been held in Smith v. Com. 14 Si & E. 69, cited in Whar. Cr. P. & P. supra. �But there is nothing in the subject or the language of the clause of the constitution under consideration to indicate that the term "conviction" is used therein in any other than the ordinary sense. Of course, it is used there and elsewhere with the understanding that the conviction was not after- wards set aside or annuUed by the court. And this is prob- ably the point of tke ruling cited from 14 S. & R. supra, that ��� �
