CUTTING V. OnTTING. 265 �and the several acts sapplemental thereto, granting arrear- ages of pensions to certain officers of the revolution, and, in case of the death of any such ofiScer before the date of the act, then to his widow, if there was one living, and, if not, to his children, included the grandchiidren of a deceased pen- sioner, whether their parents died before or after the death of such pensioner, and that they were entitled to take their share of such pension as the representatives oif their deceased parent. �In the course of the opinion of the court, Mr. Justice Mc- Lean says: "Should the word 'children,' as used in these statutes, be more restricted than when used in a *ill ? In the construction of wills, unless there is something to control a different meaning, the word 'children' is often held to mean grandclildren. There is no argument that can be drawn from human sympathy to exclude grandchiidren from the bounty, whether we look to the donors or the chief recip- ient. Congress, from high motives of policy, by granting pensions, alleviate, as far as they may, a class of men who suffered in the military service by the hardships they endured and the dangers they eneountered. But to withhold any arrearage of this bounty from his grandchiidren, who had the misfortune to be left orphans, and give it to his living chil- dren on his decease, would not seem to be a fit discrimination of national gratitude. • * * Congress has not named grandchiidren in the acts, but they are included in the equity of the statutes. And the argument that the pension is a gratuity, and was intended to be personal, will apply as well to grandchiidren as to children. * * * On a deliberate consideration of the above statutes we have corne to the con- clusion that the word 'children,' in the acts, embraces the grandchiidren of the deceased pensioner, whether their par- ents died before or after his decease. And we think they are entitled, per stirpes, to a distributive share of the deceased parent." �This case is decidedly in point. The analogy between i* and the case at bar is complete and instructive. The grant proffered by the donation act — partioularly the fourth section. ��� �
