Y74: FEDEBA.L EEPORTER. �receiver appointed by the court. It is contended that the mode of proceeding adopted in this case is peeuliar to the state of New York, where it grew up under the rules framed by Chancellor Walworth, to carry into effect the provisions of the Eevised Statutes of that state with regard to creditors' bills. But it would seem that Mr, Justice McLean enter- tained bills similar to the bill in this case without hesitation. In Lamon v. Clark, 4 McLean, 18, the bill alleged that "the defendant had equitable things in action and other property which cannot be reached by execution, and that he also had debts due to him by persans unkriown." These allegations are as general and unspecific as those contained in the bill under consideration, but the bill was, nevertheless, entertained. It is asserted by counsel that this jurisdiction was taken under a statute of Michigan similar to that of New York. But the court expressly repudiated the notion that a state statute can confer jurisdiction in equity upon the courts of the United States, although the latter may adopt modes of proceeding and partieular remedies, when the cause is within their juris- diction, and the proceedings adopted are conformable to the general principles by which courts of equity are govemed. And with respect to the case before it the court observes : "The jurisdiction is appropriate to chancery, and 7nay be exer- ercised where tkere is no special statute. Similar relief is given in England. 1 Vernon, 398; 1 P. Wms. 445; 2 Dickens, 575; Ambler, 79-455; 20 John. 563; 2 John. Ch. 283- 296; 4 John. Ch. 691." �In Pettit V. Chandler, before cited, the bill, after alleging judgment obtained, execution issued, and return of nulla bona, proceeded to state that "for a long time before the recovery of the judgments Pettit had transacted, in his own name, business to a large amount in New York, and was possessed of great property, and that he had not pretended or given out that he had become insolvent, or had lost any property, but that just before the recovery of the judgments in favor of the complainant he had suddenly stopped doing business in his own name with the avowed intention of preventing the com- nlainant from obtaining satisfaction of his judgments; that ��� �
