THE B. F. WOOLSEY. 117 �hold possession till the shipwright's charges are paid. The court has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject-matter because the cause is maritime. The fact that the vessel is a domestic vessel is immaterial. It will not tolerate a perpetuai holding of a vessel to enforce payment. Such perpetuai holding is contrary to its maxim that ships were made to plow the sea, not to rot by the, wall. Theref ore it will exer- cise itspower to sell, and thus do substantial justice between the parties. �It is not, however, true, as it seems to me, that the libel- lant's lien is a mere common-law possessory lien, without any right to have the vessel sold to satisfy the lien. The state statute, as to all after-made contraots under which, a lien would arise at common law, has enlarged the rights of the lienor and given him a lien not merely to hold, but a lien with the right to have it enforccd by a sale of the chattel. Although in the particular c^se of a maritime contract the proposed remedy f ails because the state cpuld not conf e.r on any of its courts jurisdiction to make the sale, yet none the less is the purpo«e of the statute. evident' to confer upoij the lienor this new and enlarged right. ,, This court hfts no diffi- culty in enforcing the i^ht of haying the vessel ^old to sat- isfy the lien, and it .will giye.full effect to all the rights intended to be granted.to the lienor according to its own method of procedure. If this is the correct, view of the stat- ute, then, of course, there is nothing in this objection. A question is suggested in the opinion of the learned,, circuit judge, (4 Ped. Kep. 558,) whether this statute of New York is not confined to cases of liens where, by the existing law, the lienor had already the right to enforce his lien by sale; the statute being intended to provide a convenient and safe remedy and mode of procedure in such cases. I think, how- ever, that the terms and evident purpose of the statute indi- cate that it is applicable to simple common-law possessory liens, such as that of the shipwright, and that it was intended to give new rights to such lienors, and to provide a remedy for their enforcement. The statute enumerates among the persons within its operation "any innkeeper, boarding-house ��� �
