510 FEDEBAIi BEFORTEB. �ond attaoliment. The case of Tayhr v. Carryl, 20 How. 583, is relied on as controlling this case. That case, of course, is conclusive that the actual possession of chattels by the exec- utive officerof one jurisdiction, under his process, is so abso- lute as to exclude any concurrent possession under process by the executive officer of a court of another jurisdiction ; but I think the cases are not analogous, and that the principle of that decision does not apply to successive garnishments. The officer does not take possession of the fund upon service of the process, such as was had in this case. The relation of debtor and creditor still continues between the garnishee and the principal defendant. That relation is liable to be dis- charged by the judgment of the court applying the fund or debt to the satisfaction of the plaintiflF's demand. For this purpose the fund or debt is wholly under the control of the court making the first attachaient, and no subsequent attach- ment can interfere with such application of the fund, if found to be needed for that purpose ; and, in this case, this court, by service of the process, acquired the undoubted right to direct the fund to be paid into court. Its jurisdiction in a suit for seamen's wages is not affected even by a prior garnishment, {The Sailor Prince, 1 Ben. 234;) and while the attachment under the process of this court was, in some respects, and especially in its effect, something more than a garnishment, yet it is like a gamisnment in this : that the fund is not, by the service of the process, actually taken into custody. But a debt garnished may never be called in. The proceeding may not resuit in a judgment against the principal defend- ant, or, if it does, the judgment may be otherwise satisued. It seems to me, therefore, that there is no difficulty in a sec- cond garnishment whereby the fund will be bound ; subject, of course, to be defeated, if the fund is called in under the first garnishment. There is not here any danger of a con- juict for possession between courts and officers of two juris- dictions, nor any interference by one officer with the possession acquired by the other under his process, which is the control- ling reason on which the rule enforced in Taylor v. Carryl ��� �
