bii FBDEBAIi BSFOBTKB. �The most careful consideration of the ease fails to procure the assent of my judgment to such a doctrine, not only for the reason already stated, but for another mentioned in the charge to the jury, that such a regulation would practically place the character of every wornan, virtuous or not, for trial before every railroad conductor, and the reputation of her private life might be at any time called in question by him. The argument that the conductor and railroad company act at their peril, and are liable in damages for mistakes in judg- ment, does not remove this difSculty. It is inadequate redress for such a wrong as that of saying to a virtuous woman that she must ride in another car because not believed to be chaste enough to ride in the "ladies' car, " set apart for vir- tuous ladies. It is an unreasonable regulation, and finds not a single case to justify it, that a conductor shall undertake to classify his passengers according to their moral character or want of it, -when their manner, dress, and habits of conduct are not offensive. �Another objection to the charge is that the court took away from the jury this question of reasonable regulation, and did not follow the ruling on the demurrer. 4 Fed. Eep. 37. But neither that ruling nor the authorities on whioh it is based warrant the assumption that the jury are to be the sole judges of the question of reasonableness. They are, as in all mixed questions of law and fa et, to apply the facts of the particular case to the principles of law laid down by the court. I charged substantially in the manner indicated in Commonwealth v. Powers, 7 Met. 603, and did not in the least encroach upon the duties of the jury. It will be found upon a critical examination that the only reason the court cannot, as a matter of law, determine the question whether the regu- lation is reasonable, is because the plea does not in sufficient detail display the facts which must control the judgment of the court. Given.undisputed facts, and the question of rea- sonableness is one of pure law. �The next objection is that the court refused to charge the jury that absence of malice on the part of the con- ductor, and good faith in the belief that he was acting rea- ��� �
